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Researchers Hijack Hugging Face's Kokoro Model Account, Exposing a Publisher-Verification Gap That Lets Weights Be Poisoned Undetected

A researcher took over the Hugging Face account behind the popular Kokoro text-to-speech model by registering its lapsed donation domain, then showed altered model weights carry no detectable malware signature.

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Overview

Security researcher Alon Hertz and his team took control of the Hugging Face account behind Kokoro, a widely used open-weight text-to-speech model, by registering a domain the account’s original owner had let lapse and using it to reset the account’s login password, according to BleepingComputer. The researchers then demonstrated that an attacker in that position could alter the model’s weights so its output diverges from its input, without changing a single line of the code that runs it — an alteration BleepingComputer reports carries no malware signature for scanners to catch.

What We Know

Kokoro converts text into speech and is built on the StyleTTS 2 and ISTFTNet architectures with 82 million parameters, trained for roughly $1,000 on a few hundred hours of permissive, non-copyrighted audio, according to its Hugging Face model card. The current release supports 8 languages and 54 voices under an Apache-2.0 license, per the same model card. Despite its developer, Hexgrad, not pushing an update since April 2025 — with the project’s GitHub repository and PyPI package going silent around the same time, BleepingComputer reports — Kokoro remains popular, with nearly 13 million monthly downloads on Hugging Face. The GitHub repository still carries 10.3k stars, according to its page.

That continued reach is what made the account an attractive target. According to BleepingComputer, Kokoro is supported by developer tools from Google, NVIDIA, and Intel, including software for voice agents and on-device speech synthesis, while AMD and Amazon Web Services have separately published guides demonstrating its use in AI-agent workflows.

In the days before BleepingComputer’s November 17 report, Hertz’s team registered the “hexgrad.com” domain listed on Kokoro’s public DONATE.md file and used it to reset the password on the publisher’s Hugging Face account, BleepingComputer reports. Rather than distribute malware, the researchers ran a controlled test in which they modified Kokoro’s model weights in 87 seconds using a gaming GPU, causing the model to produce altered output. “We changed what this model says by fine-tuning its neural weights. Same input text. Same voice file. Same configuration. Same inference code — not a single line touched in the application that runs it,” Hertz told BleepingComputer.

The team never uploaded the altered weights to Hugging Face, reasoning that doing so would put production systems depending on the model at risk, BleepingComputer reports. Separate tests the researchers ran from another account showed Hugging Face would not flag the change as suspicious: the publisher would appear unchanged, the file delivery route, format, and architecture would match, and file sizes would stay similar, with no malware present to detect.

Hertz told BleepingComputer the underlying problem extends well beyond Kokoro: “Hugging Face does not vet publishers. It doesn’t verify whether an account is still held by its original, legitimate owner — or by whoever quietly took it over last week. It doesn’t vet the models or datasets those accounts upload.” He added that the same exposure follows models and datasets wherever they travel next: “The same unvetted weights and datasets flow through mirrors and converted versions, GitHub releases, package registries, deployment guides, and direct downloads across the entire open-model ecosystem.” BleepingComputer notes that even accounts that were never hijacked carry risk, since an account can maintain a legitimate-looking history for a period before an owner — or someone who has taken control of it — pushes a harmful update.

What We Don’t Know

Hertz reported the issue to Hugging Face hoping for a quick fix, but had received no response as of BleepingComputer’s November 17 report. BleepingComputer says it separately contacted Hugging Face for comment and also had not received a reply by publication. It is not publicly known whether Hugging Face has since changed its account-verification or domain-based password-reset process, or whether the platform plans to require reverification when a model’s contact domain changes ownership.

Why It Matters

The technique Hertz demonstrated does not rely on a software vulnerability in Hugging Face’s code; it exploits the same trust assumption that package registries like npm and PyPI have had to confront in a string of 2026 maintainer-account hijacks — that a publisher account still belongs to whoever originally created it. Hertz’s own framing of the risk, that unvetted weights and datasets move onward through “mirrors and converted versions, GitHub releases, package registries, deployment guides, and direct downloads,” places model hubs squarely inside the same supply chain that dependency-registry security efforts have spent 2026 trying to harden.